William Temple Foundation

Across the world there is a long history of political mobilization of religious communities, and the statistical association of particular faiths and denominations with voting for particular political parties. In the UK (with the exception of Northern Ireland) the correlations are relatively weak over the last century, and were assumed to be declining with secularisation. However as political contestation has taken a cultural turn and economics and social class are less important politically, religious identity remains, and possibly grows in importance in what some consider to be a post secular society. This blog, in two parts, seeks to explore how religion may have played out in the recent General Election first at the national level in England and then at the local level, in one constituency.

National Level Analysis

For many people the initial religious response can be summarized as a  big “thank God, they’ve gone”! There is some cautious encouragement in a new tone, the rhetoric about public service, and integrity, and with the  CVs of new ministers and MPs.  But the concerns about the equation between seats won versus votes cast can only underline the case for electoral reform. And the historically low turn out of voters (51%) indicates that  “hidden behind the celebration of Labour’s ‘landslide’ win is a depressing disfranchisement”  especially of people who feel left behind, powerless to change their lives, and skeptical of all politicians.

A paper by Smith and Woodhead 2018 traced the associations between religious identity and the voting patterns in the Brexit Referendum of 2016. More recently survey data (pre election) from Theos Religion Counts: What do the religious think about key election issues?  breaks down attitudes to poverty and immigration by faith identity and practice. Nominal Anglicans in particular come out as the least progressive. For the general election of July 2024 we are waiting to see a detailed statistical analysis of exit polls, but first impressions show religious identity is significant, and still sometimes divisive.

The constituency results (see this BBC news page for maps of the results and party vote shares by constituency) clearly have some correlation with  the 2021 census (voluntary) question on religion (which is a very basic one indicating nothing more than a household identifying with a particular religious category or “no religion”). Looking at area based data for religion (which can be done on this ONS census map page) needs to be done with caution, especially when constituency boundaries do not match the local authority areas which are reported in census data. However, having looked at the Census data on religion in England and Wales only for a forthcoming research paper, a few things stand out, and generate some hypotheses for further investigation.

Areas with the highest proportion of “No Religion” produced some interesting results. Two of the Green MPs are in cities which are top of the “no religion” league  (Brighton (55% No religion)  and Bristol (51%). No religion in these cities correlates with a population with high proportions of young graduates and professional, and significantly large LGBTQI communities. The other two Green  MPs were elected in more rural areas in Suffolk and Herefordshire, where “no religion” rates were around or slightly above  average, but with little religious diversity. It is possible tactical voting may have played a part here.

But Reform MPs were elected in Ashfield which is also in the top five districts for “no religion” (around 50%)  while Clacton, Boston, Basildon and Great Yarmouth are also above average no religion but also well above average Christian. All these constituencies, and many others where Reform came second with a high proportion of votes, (in places such as Hull and the North east of England) are very undiverse religiously, with a white majority, older electorate, and a more working class history. They also strongly voted “leave” in the Brexit referendum.

On the other hand the areas recording the highest proportion of Christians are in South Lancashire and Merseyside. They have low levels of religious diversity but had massive proportions of Labour votes, and poor performances by Reform. This is perhaps associated with strong residual Roman Catholic loyalties.

In constituencies with high proportions of Muslim voters the Labour vote share was generally lower than previously, with the war in Gaza being a salient issue and favoured independent (“Muslim Vote”) candidates. In many of these constituencies the campaigning was reported as being brutal and frightening. Independents ousted Labour from Blackburn, Dewsbury and Batley, Birmingham Perry Barr and Leicester South. However, in most multicultural constituencies Labour held on to their seats, for example in East Ham veteran evangelical MP Sir Stephen Timms held on with a reduced majority, but still commanded 51.6% of the votes cast.  Leicester East, one of the most religiously diverse constituencies in England was an outlier. It became the only seat the Conservatives took from Labour, with a strong showing from Liberal Democrats and Independents that reduced the Labour vote by nearly 30%. Interestingly Harrow East which is one of the areas with the highest proportion of Hindus in England,  is one of a handful of London constituencies that remain in Conservative hands, with only a 1% fall of the Tory vote.

Local Level Analysis from Oldham

This very brief analysis looks at voting patterns within the constituency of Oldham East and Saddleworth, which perhaps illustrate the widest diversity of deprivation in an English constituency: in terms of IMD-21, Greenfield in Saddleworth represented the least deprived 97.5% while sections of Glodwick characterise the most deprived 0.8%. About 3.5 miles separate these two areas. But it also illustrates the complexity of seeking to include faith into the analysis. The election turnout was 55%, so down compared to 2019 when 64% of eligible voters actually voted. Oldham generally returns a Labour MP. In 2024, Labour won with 35% of the vote (in 2019 they won, again, with 44%). Reform was second with 19% but in 2019 the principal protest vote went to the Brexit Party which won 6.5%. The Conservatives came third with 17% (40% in 2019). George Galloway’s Workers Party came fourth with 11%. The Liberal Democrats were fifth at nearly 9% (5.2% in 2019). The contributions of faith to these voting choices must remain tentative. And the overlap (or underpinning) of faith occurs within a spectrum expressed in terms of orthodoxy, intensity, geographical distribution and, of course, those actual faiths expressed.

Wealthier areas voted Conservative, as seen most obviously in the largely white areas of Saddleworth albeit with an increased Liberal presence. The Labour vote there was not small, which might reflect tactical voting, for example to counter Reform. Greater numbers attend Church in these areas than the regional average, but the paucity of good secondary education complicates these analyses: strong anecdotal evidence suggests many of those attending Church do so to earn ‘points’ for school entry. Seeking a correlation between voting preference and Church attendance will be easier here than correlations between voting and faith conviction.

In the poorest white areas, the Labour vote also decreased, generally to Reform. In terms of IMD, these areas typically evince lower educational attainment, health, and employment. Many local people describe themselves as ‘Christian’ but few attend a Church, which has been described ‘a bequeathed Christian background’ but could, conversely, result from working countless hours in the gig-economy.

Oldham has many Asian-majority areas (most of predominantly Pakistan heritage but some having a majority with Bangladeshi heritage). Very high Mosque attendance contrasts with tiny Church attendance, as expected. These areas experienced a swing from Labour to the Workers Party and, similarly, at the local elections in May, a Workers Party member won in the previously safe Labour ward of Waterhead, East Oldham (but stood as an independent). Conversations ‘on the doorsteps’ suggest the war in Gaza triggered this transfer of allegiance, so the situation in Oldham illustrates a national phenomenon in miniature. The Labour vote was highest in what are, for this constituency, middle-income areas that tend to be multi-ethnic, white–Asian. Anecdotal evidence in these areas suggests both tactical voting and relatively high Church- and Mosque-attendances. The Reform vote was fairly substantial across Oldham as a whole but lower in the more affluent areas. Finally, Oldham has many African members who generally live in the poorer areas. A great many have a strong, vibrant, Christian faith those who are asylum seekers cannot vote.

Revd Dr Paul Monk is Vicar of the Anglican Churches of Clarksfield: St Barnabas’ and Waterhead: Holy Trinity, both in Oldham. He is also Vicar of Glodwick and Assistant Curate at St Thomas’ Church, Moorside. Paul is also on the Board of Trustees for the William Temple Foundation.

Greg Smith is a Senior Research Fellow for thew William Temple Foundation who has worked for over 40 years in urban mission, community development and social research. Greg is now retired.

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